Nash Equilibria in Games with Continuous Action Spaces

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 4 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 77-103 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In previous chapters, we examined how to find best responses when players face discrete strategy spaces (e.g., left or right, or set high or low prices). While helpful to understand the notion of best response in simultaneous-move games, many economic settings allow for continuous, rather than discrete, action spaces, such as firms choosing how much output to produce, which price to set for their products, or how much to invest in advertising. A similar argument applies to other social sciences, such as the political platform that candidates choose when they run for office, or how much each donor contributes to a charity.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_4

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