Signaling Games with Continuous Messages

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 12 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 379-408 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Chapters 10 and 11 consider, for simplicity, players choosing from discrete action spaces (e.g., two messages from the worker and two responses from the firm). More general settings, however, may allow for the sender to choose her message from a continuous action space (e.g., years of education, $$e\ge 0$$ e ≥ 0 ) and, similarly, the receiver to respond with a continuous action (e.g., a wage $$w\ge 0$$ w ≥ 0 ).

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_12

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