Repeated Games

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 7 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 203-251 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we consider situations in which players interact in one of the strategic settings previously analyzed and they play the game for several rounds, which are known as “repeated games.” In real life, agents often interact for long periods of time, facing the same institutional or industry characteristics in each period (i.e., the same “rules of the game”). In this respect, repeated games can help us describe many observed settings and predict strategic behavior in real-life scenarios.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_7

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