Negotiation, Game Theory and Language Games

Margit Gaffal (mgaffal@ucm.es) and Jesús Padilla Gálvez (jesus.padilla@uclm.es)
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Margit Gaffal: Complutense University
Jesús Padilla Gálvez: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha

Chapter Chapter 2 in Dynamics of Rational Negotiation, 2023, pp 11-40 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The chapter examines negotiation as a process that is governed by rules and adheres to a structure. The strategies adopted by the negotiating partners can be described systemically within the framework of game theory. The authors contrast the two types of cooperative and non-cooperative games and provide insight into their respective dynamics. Both types are analysed as sets of strategic moves with possible outcomes. The question of which strategies are used can only be answered by analysing the language games that negotiating partners use in specific situations of a negotiation. This includes knowing how two or more negotiators express themselves appropriately to reach an agreement. It also includes knowing how to reach the best possible outcome for both in each situation. The study of language games aims to reveal the strategic steps that negotiators employ in the process of decision-making. Language games are considered as anchored within specific forms of life that influence the outcome of negotiations.

Keywords: Game theory; Cooperative games; Non-cooperative games; Language games; Form of life (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-49051-4_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-49051-4_2

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