Bargaining and Game Theory

Margit Gaffal (mgaffal@ucm.es) and Jesús Padilla Gálvez (jesus.padilla@uclm.es)
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Margit Gaffal: Complutense University
Jesús Padilla Gálvez: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha

Chapter Chapter 3 in Dynamics of Rational Negotiation, 2023, pp 41-60 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The chapter analyses the process of bargaining as a strategy in which negotiators follow the principle of utility regarding their objectives. It examines how competitive and cooperative strategies affect the overall outcome of negotiations. The classical approach is based on the premise that rational bargaining means making the best decisions for maximising the negotiators’ interests. The maximisation approach is criticised, and a solution in favour of optimisation is proposed. The authors contrast the asymmetric maximisation of profits of competitive games to Pareto's proposals that facilitate a two-sided optimisation of outcomes. They discuss possible strategies in the case of a Nash equilibrium and analyse the corresponding results. Mixed strategies are used to prevent one's own strategies from becoming predictable for the other. Bluffing and lying are used in opposing strategies to induce the other party to change his behaviour and to derive some profit from this change.

Keywords: Zero-sum games; Non-zero-sum games; Pareto optimum; Nash equilibrium; Saddle point; Bluffing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-49051-4_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-49051-4_3

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