Moderation of the Threat of Buyers

James O. Fiet ()
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James O. Fiet: University of Louisville

Chapter Chapter 23 in The Theoretical Logic of Strategy, 2025, pp 119-122 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract If buyers become powerful, they can refuse to buy or they can demand more favorable terms. This chapter explores moderators of buyer powerpower.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-79014-0_23

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-79014-0_23

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