Cooperation vs. Collusion Strategy

James O. Fiet ()
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James O. Fiet: University of Louisville

Chapter Chapter 41 in The Theoretical Logic of Strategy, 2025, pp 199-202 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Cooperation may eventuate through the efforts of rivals who wish to stimulate primary demand. Collusion occurs when several firms reduce rivalryrivalry and raise prices above the fully competitive level.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-79014-0_41

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-79014-0_41

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