Inverse Campaigning

Kai Konrad

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2004, pp 347-360 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract It can be advantageous for an ‘office motivated’ party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties’ rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose a lot and do not benefit small groups of voters who gain a lot.

Date: 2004
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Journal Article: Inverse Campaigning (2004)
Working Paper: Inverse Campaigning (2003)
Working Paper: Inverse campaigning (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_20

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