Inverse Campaigning

Kai Konrad

No 905, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much.

Keywords: inverse campaigning; information; voting; policy design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Related works:
Chapter: Inverse Campaigning (2004)
Journal Article: Inverse Campaigning (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_905

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