Modeling Evacuees’ Exit Selection with Best Response Dynamics

Harri Ehtamo, Simo Heliövaara (), Simo Hostikka and Timo Korhonen
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Harri Ehtamo: Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Analysis Laboratory
Simo Heliövaara: Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Analysis Laboratory
Simo Hostikka: VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
Timo Korhonen: VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland

A chapter in Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics 2008, 2010, pp 309-319 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We present a model for occupants’ exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically according to other players’ strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players’ best response functions defines a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the model the players are the occupants and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and analyze its properties with simple test simulations.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Queue Length; Game Theoretic Model; Patience Parameter; Preference Number (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-04504-2_27

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04504-2_27

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