Appendix—Derivation of Optimal Bid in a First Price Auction

Christoph Pfeiffer ()
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Christoph Pfeiffer: Competitio Consulting GmbH

Chapter Chapter 9 in Game Theory - Successful Negotiation in Purchasing, 2023, pp 133-136 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Dutch and sealed-bid first-price auctions require more complex calculations on the part of auction participants than English or second-price auctions, where the amount of the bid or withdrawal from the auction simply depends on the reserve price. As long as the price is above the reserve price, it is advantageous for the bidder to continue participating in the auction.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-40868-8_9

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