 Government and Market Reform Report Recommendations for Compensation or RemiunerationFrancesco de Zwart
Chapter Chapter 12 in The Key Code and Advanced Handbook for the Governance and Supervision of Banks in Australia, 2022, pp 525-594 from Springer Abstract: Abstract Chapter 12 of the Key Code and Advanced Handbook examines government and market reform report recommendations for compensation or remuneration beginning with the recommendations of the Walker Review 2009 including the Compensation/Remuneration Committee and remuneration policy, executives and ‘high end’ employees, an overview of the Walker Review 2009 recommendations and ‘say-on-pay’ shareholder votes. We then examine the OECD Key Findings of 2009, the absence of pay for performance and Moody’s challenges for executive compensation as a forerunner to reviewing the existing compensation variables from Stage 1. These include a summary of the studies and relational effect paths for the [DirCEO$] (+/−), [EqOptIncent] (+), [EqOptEntrch] (−) and [CompCom] (+/−) variables. There follows an examination of the Compensation/Remuneration Committee and high end employees to identify the risk ‘alignment’ effect and risk ‘failure’ effect of equity and options as well as the Compensation/Remuneration Committee variables for risk alignment with shareholders and risk-taking in excess of risk appetite. Here, there is emphasis on the significant [EqOptRiskAlignHighEnd] (+) and [EqOptRiskFailHighEnd] (−) variables. Section 12.6 adds new governance variables for Compensation/Remuneration Committee composition, functions and policies in the ASX Principles and Recommendations, APRA’s Revised Draft CPS 511, the Walker Review 2009, APRA Final Report and the NAB Self-Assessment 2018. There follows the NAB Self-Assessment 2018 responsibilities for the Compensation/Remuneration Committee and governance variables for Compensation/Remuneration Committee functions and policies in the OECD Key Findings 2009 and the OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices. We examine the IIF Risk-based incentive principles, long-term profitability adjusted for cost of capital, risk-taking and risk appetite, adjustments for the ‘risk time horizon’, adjustments for organization as a whole and firm-wide profit, severance pay and transparency and disclosure. Section 12.16 reviews the IIF examples of risk-adjusted compensation and incentives and Sect. 12.17 reviews the disclosure of bands and elements of compensation for executives and high end employees and anonymous disclosure of pay ‘bands’ for ‘high end’ employees. The Chapter then moves to examine relevant restrictions, delay, lock-up, deferral and clawback of incentive payments with the associated relational effect paths. Relevant principles include that remuneration should not promote excessive risks and principles relating to ‘material risk takers’, deferral, ‘malus/forfeiture’ provisions and ‘clawback’ including the APRA Final Report findings for risk adjustments and variable remuneration. There follows variables for failure to adjust pay bonuses for risks incurred for low level employees, required minimum shareholdings of executive board members, executives and high end employees including vesting arrangements and ‘skin in the game’ shareholdings and ‘retention’ vesting arrangements. We then examine formal codes of conduct for remuneration consultants including use of the code by the Compensation/Remuneration Committee to engage advisers. We conclude with significant variables for incentive payments and bonuses to be calculated by economic profit and not revenue, remuneration design adjustments for the firm’s risk appetite, cost of capital and liquidity risk, adjusting pay benchmarks for risk and remuneration consequences for breaches of company risk appetite limits, internal procedures and legal requirements. Keywords: Walker Review 2009; Compensation/remuneration committee; Executives; High end employees; Existing alignment effect; Existing entrenchment effect; Risk alignment effect of equity and options; Risk failure effect of equity and options; Restrictions; Delay; Lock-up and deferral of incentive payments; Malus/forfeiture of incentive payments; Clawback of incentive payments (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-1710-2_12 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-1710-2_12 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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