 Incentive: The Missing Pillar in the ECAIS InstitutionsA K M Kamrul Hasan () and
Yasushi Suzuki
Chapter Chapter 5 in Implementation of Basel Accords in Bangladesh, 2021, pp 105-122 from Springer Abstract: Abstract We have detailed discussed about role of incentive and sanction while formulation of institutions in Chapter 4 from neo-institutional economist perspective and discussed on ECAIs liability regime (a kind of sanction) in the institutions in that chapter. This chapter sheds an analytical light on incentive in the ECAIs institutions that ensure the quality of ECAIs credit information while quantification of credit risk under Basel Accord. To examine the ECAIs incentive for rating accuracy we analyze the institutions in one hand and an empirical investigation in another hand. The discussion will aid to understand the anomaly (i) that we develop in Chapter 1. The chapter is organized as follows: Sect. 5.2 discusses how a CRA’s rating is used for regulatory purposes in Bangladesh, and Sect. 5.3 presents detailed a discussion on quality of ECAIs credit information based on in-depth interview conducted in 2018 and 2019 and the relevant articles in ECAIs regulations. Section 5.4 summarizes the findings of research on ECAIs incentive in the existing institutions. Section 5.5 presents the concluding remarks. Date: 2021 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-3472-7_5 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-3472-7_5 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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