Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

A chapter in Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, 2016, pp 31-45 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper establishes the acyclicity of Cournot tatonnement in a strategic game with aggregation and monotone best responses, under the broadest assumptions on aggregation rules allowing the Huang–Dubey–Haimanko–Zapechelnyuk–Jensen trick to work and with minimal topological restrictions.

Keywords: Binary Relation; Aggregation Rule; Strategy Profile; Strategic Game; Additive Aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Cournot tatonnement in aggregative games with monotone best responses (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_4

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