 Procurement AuctionsPak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia Chapter 10 in Auction Theory, 2021, pp 251-281 from Springer Abstract: Abstract This chapter examines procurement auctions, such as those that utility companies use to deliver water or garbage collection services, under different settings. In these auctions, firms compete to be awarded the service delivery contract, privately observe their costs, and bid to a social planner who seeks to award the contract to the most efficient firm (lowest cost). Keywords: Procurement auctions; Town mayor; Water distribution; Water production; Reservation utility; Welfare function; Procurer; Contract; Distortionary taxes; Shadow cost; Public funds; Partial derivative; Quasilinear utility function; Voluntary participation; Individual rationality; Single-crossing property; Spence-Mirrlees sorting condition; Unconstrained problem; Marginal virtual cost; Information rent; Truthful revelation; No distortion at the top; External effects; Positive externalities; Negative externalities; Perfect monitoring; Imperfect monitoring; Monitoring cost; Monitoring probability; Conservation project; Migratory birds; Biodiversity value; Acreage of farmland; Know-how; Monotonicity; Under-investment; Flat rate payment scheme (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_10 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0_10 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer |
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