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Auction Theory

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer

Date: 2021
ISBN: 978-3-030-69575-0
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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 Second-Price Auctions
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 2 First-Price Auctions
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 3 First-Price Auctions: Extensions
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 4 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 6 The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 7 Common-Value Auctions
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 8 Multi-Unit Auctions
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 9 Mechanism Design
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia
Ch 10 Procurement Auctions
Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Related works:
Chapter: Auction Theory (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptbec:978-3-030-69575-0

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0

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