First-Price Auctions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter 2 in Auction Theory, 2021, pp 27-61 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we analyze first-price auctions, where every bidder privately observes his valuation for the object and submits his bid to the seller (e.g., in a sealed envelope). The seller ranks all bids, selects as a winner the bidder who submitted the highest bid to pay the bid he submitted. All other bidders pay zero and not receive the object.

Keywords: First-price auction; Sealed envelope; Marginal cost; Marginal benefit; First-price auction under complete information; First-price auction under incomplete information; Equilibrium bidding function; Direct approach; Envelope theorem approach; Dutch auction; Descending auction; Babylon; Tulip fever; Government securities; Independent and identically distributed values; Expected utility maximization problem; Generic distribution; Integration by parts; Chain rule; Probability weight; Density function; Cumulative distribution function; Expected value; Variance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0_2

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