Auction Theory

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer

Date: 2021
ISBN: 978-3-030-69575-0
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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 Second-Price Auctions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 2 First-Price Auctions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 3 First-Price Auctions: Extensions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 4 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 6 The Revenue Equivalence Principle

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 7 Common-Value Auctions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 8 Multi-Unit Auctions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 9 Mechanism Design

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch 10 Procurement Auctions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

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Chapter: Auction Theory (2023)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0

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