Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 2 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2016, pp 25-60 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psNE) This chapter analyzes behavior in relatively simple strategic settings: Simultaneous-move games simultaneous-move games of complete informationComplete information . Let us define the two building blocks of this chapter: best responsesBest responses and Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2016
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Chapter: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32963-5_2

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