Social Choice

Hans Peters

Chapter 11 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 193-203 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Social choice theory studies the aggregation of individual preferences into a common or social preference. It overlaps with several social science disciplines, such as political theory (e.g., voting for Parliament, or for a president) and game theory (e.g., voters may vote strategically, or candidates may choose positions strategically).

Keywords: Social Choice Function; Borda Score; Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem; Condorcet Winner; Copeland Score (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_11

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