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Game Theory

Hans Peters

in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer

Date: 2015
Edition: 2nd ed. 2015
ISBN: 978-3-662-46950-7
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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 Introduction
Hans Peters
Ch 2 Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
Hans Peters
Ch 3 Finite Two-Person Games
Hans Peters
Ch 4 Finite Extensive Form Games
Hans Peters
Ch 5 Finite Games with Incomplete Information
Hans Peters
Ch 6 Noncooperative Games: Extensions
Hans Peters
Ch 7 Repeated Games
Hans Peters
Ch 8 An Introduction to Evolutionary Games
Hans Peters
Ch 9 Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
Hans Peters
Ch 10 Cooperative Game Models
Hans Peters
Ch 11 Social Choice
Hans Peters
Ch 12 Matrix Games
Hans Peters
Ch 13 Finite Games
Hans Peters
Ch 14 Extensive Form Games
Hans Peters
Ch 15 Evolutionary Games
Hans Peters
Ch 16 TU-Games: Domination, Stable Sets, and the Core
Hans Peters
Ch 17 The Shapley Value
Hans Peters
Ch 18 Core, Shapley Value, and Weber Set
Hans Peters
Ch 19 The Nucleolus
Hans Peters
Ch 20 Special Transferable Utility Games
Hans Peters
Ch 21 Bargaining Problems
Hans Peters
Ch 22 Tools
Hans Peters
Ch 23 Review Problems for Part I
Hans Peters
Ch 24 Hints, Answers and Solutions
Hans Peters

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7

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