TU-Games: Domination, Stable Sets, and the Core

Hans Peters

Chapter 16 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 291-303 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In a game with transferable utility (TU-game) each coalition (subset of players) is characterized by its worth, i.e., a real number representing the payoff or utility that the coalition can achieve if it forms. It is assumed that this payoff can be freely distributed among the members of the coalition in any way desired.

Keywords: Prove Theorem; Payoff Distribution; Simple Game; Grand Coalition; Veto Player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_16

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