An Introduction to Evolutionary Games

Hans Peters

Chapter 8 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 139-150 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In an evolutionary game, players are interpreted as populations—of animals or individuals. The probabilities in a mixed strategy of a player in a bimatrix game are interpreted as shares of the population. Individuals within the same part of the population play the same pure strategy. The main ‘solution’ concept is the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy. Evolutionary game

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Evolutionary Game; Average Fitness; Replicator Dynamic; Evolutionary Stable Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_8

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