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Finite Two-Person Games

Hans Peters

Chapter 3 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 37-49 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we consider two-player games where each player chooses from finitely many pure strategies or randomizes among these strategies. In contrast to Chap. 2 it is no longer required that the sum of the players’ payoffs is zero (or, equivalently, constant). This allows for a much larger class of games, including many games relevant for economic or other applications. Famous examples are the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes discussed in Sect. 1.3.2

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy; Expected Payoff; Good Reply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_3

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