Bargaining Problems

Hans Peters

Chapter 21 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 375-386 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The game-theoretic literature on bargaining can be divided in two strands: the cooperative and the noncooperative approach. Here, the focus is on the cooperative approach, which was initiated by Nash (1950) and which is axiomatic in nature; see Sect. 10.1 for a first discussion. A seminal article on noncooperative bargaining is Rubinstein (1982). The basic idea of that paper is briefly repeated below, but see Sect. 6.7 for a more elaborate discussion. We conclude the chapter with a few remarks on games with nontransferable utility (NTU-games).

Keywords: Bargaining Solution; Bargaining Problem; Nash Bargaining Solution; Scale Covariance; Egalitarian Solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_21

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