Matrix Games

Hans Peters

Chapter 12 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 207-213 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we study finite two-person zero-sum games—matrix games—more rigorously. In particular, von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem is proved. The chapter extends Chap. 2 in Part I. Although it is self-contained, it may be useful to (re)read Chap. 2 first.

Keywords: Matrix Game; Minimax Theorem; Saddlepoint; Maximin Strategy; Duality Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783662469507

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().