An Algorithm to Enhance Safety Collaboration Within Chemical Industrial Parks

Genserik Reniers () and Yulia Pavlova
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Genserik Reniers: University of Antwerp
Yulia Pavlova: MTT Agrifood Research Finland

Chapter Chapter 5 in Using Game Theory to Improve Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks, 2013, pp 73-90 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter provides a game-theoretic analysis of strategic cooperation on safety among chemical companies within a chemical industrial park. An algorithm that can be used by the Multi-Plant Council to develop an incentive system, is suggested. Furthermore, a stepwise plan to improve cross-company safety management in a chemical industrial cluster is proposed and an illustrative example is provided.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Dominant Strategy; Coordination Game; Domino Effect; Full Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ssrchp:978-1-4471-5052-7_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4471-5052-7_5

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