Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation

Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov () and Vyacheslav Yakuba ()
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Alexander Ivanov: National Research University Higher School of Economics
Vyacheslav Yakuba: National Research University Higher School of Economics

A chapter in Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, 2021, pp 231-249 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study the problem of manipulation in voting and extend the individual manipulability results in Favardin and Lepelley (2006) for the case of multiple choice, impartial culture, and consider 3, 4, and, for some cases, 5 alternatives. For impartial culture, the results in general are similar to impartial anonymous culture case. For multiple choice and 3 alternatives, results are consistent only for some extension axioms, but for Leximax extension, the Hare and Inverse Borda's rules are among the least manipulable ones. For considered cases for 4 and 5 alternatives, Borda's rule is the least manipulable one for manipulability with reactions (Type IV in Favardin and Lepelley (2006) classification).

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_10

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