Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models

Edited by Mostapha Diss and Vincent Merlin ()

in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer, currently edited by Marc Fleurbaey and Maurice Salles

Date: 2021
ISBN: 978-3-030-48598-6
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Chapters in this book:

Introduction

Mostapha Diss and Vincent Merlin

Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention

Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou and Hatem Smaoui

The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner

Mostapha Diss, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi and Abdelmonaim Tlidi

Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Martin Strobel

On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox

William V. Gehrlein and Vincent Merlin

Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules

Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih

Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union

Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet and Laurent Vidu

“One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May

Olivier Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton and Issofa Moyouwou

Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation

Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov and Vyacheslav Yakuba

Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions

Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer and Martin Strobel

Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems

Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou

Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results

Fabrice Barthélémy and Mathieu Martin

Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections

Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez

Combinatorics of Election Scores

Alexander Karpov

From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture

Issofa Moyouwou, Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga and Boniface Mbih

IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report

Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Issofa Moyouwou and Hatem Smaoui

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6

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