Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections

Sébastien Courtin () and Matias Nuñez
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Sébastien Courtin: Normandie Université, Unicaen, CREM, UMR CNRS

A chapter in Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, 2021, pp 317-343 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We fully describe the set of equilibrium winners in a model of strategic Approval voting. To this end, we introduce the concept of viable candidate: a candidate is viable if the number of voters who do not rank him last is larger than the number of voters who rank first any other candidate. If at most two candidates are viable, we prove that the unique equilibrium winner is the Condorcet Winner. For any election with more viable candidates, we show that for some utility profiles we can build an equilibrium in which all the viable candidates are tied for victory.

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis on Large Elections (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_14

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