Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules

Raouia Belayadi () and Boniface Mbih
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Raouia Belayadi: Normandie Université, Unicaen, CREM, UMR CNRS 6211

A chapter in Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, 2021, pp 137-160 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Reversal symmetry is satisfied by a voting rule if the winner of an election is different from the one who is elected when all individual preferences are reversed. We study the vulnerability—in terms of frequencies of violation—of a set of usual and well-known simple and runoff scoring rules to the violation of reversal symmetry. We show that the pattern of the results is very different depending on whether the rule under consideration is a simple scoring rule or a scoring rule with runoff.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_7

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