Testing Theories of Lawmaking

Keith Krehbiel (), Adam Meirowitz () and Jonathan Woon ()
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Keith Krehbiel: Stanford University
Adam Meirowitz: Princeton University
Jonathan Woon: Stanford University

A chapter in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, 2005, pp 249-268 from Springer

Abstract: Summary Tests of formal models of legislative politics have become increasingly common, and have tended to draw confident and positive inferences about focal theories. This is not a particularly satisfactory development, however, inasmuch as the supposedly supported theories are quite different from one another, and the tests that generate the support tend overwhelmingly to focus on one theory rather than competing theories. We develop and employ a method of comparative theory-testing using estimates of cutpoints on final passage results. The findings are inconclusive in part because the theories, while substantively different, are often operationally nearly observationally equivalent.

Keywords: Ideal Point; Median Voter; American Political Science Review; Roll Call; Final Passage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-27295-3_10

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_10

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