Social Choice and Strategic Decisions

Edited by David Austen-Smith and John Duggan

in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer, currently edited by Marc Fleurbaey and Maurice Salles

Date: 2005
ISBN: 978-3-540-27295-3
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Chapters in this book:

Introduction and Overview

David Austen-Smith and John Duggan

Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates

Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan

Local Political Equilibria

Norman Schofield

Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information

Enriqueta Aragones and Thomas R. Palfrey

Party Objectives in the “Divide a Dollar” Electoral Competition

Jean-François Laslier

Generalized Bandit Problems

Rangarajan K. Sundaram

The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Breton

Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining

Daniel Diermeier and Rebecca Morton

Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities

Randall L. Calvert and Nathan Dietz

Testing Theories of Lawmaking

Keith Krehbiel, Adam Meirowitz and Jonathan Woon

Deliberation and Voting Rules

David Austen-Smith and Timothy Feddersen

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-540-27295-3

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DOI: 10.1007/b138884

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