The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Breton ()
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Michel Breton: University of Toulouse 1

A chapter in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, 2005, pp 163-199 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among various regions, projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks set and the Uncovered Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be proper subsets of the set of all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their predictions. This contrasts with well-known “chaos theorems,” which suggest that majority voting does not lead to any meaningful predictions when the policy space is multidimensional.

Keywords: Social Choice; Condorcet Winner; Public Project; Feasible Allocation; Distributive Politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-27295-3_7

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_7

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