Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities

Randall L. Calvert () and Nathan Dietz ()
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Randall L. Calvert: Washington University
Nathan Dietz: Corporation for National and Community Service

A chapter in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, 2005, pp 227-247 from Springer

Keywords: Ideal Point; Winning Coalition; Valid Strategy; Bargaining Model; Coalition Member (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_9

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