Party Objectives in the “Divide a Dollar” Electoral Competition

Jean-François Laslier

A chapter in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, 2005, pp 113-130 from Springer

Abstract: Summary In the “divide a dollar” framework of distributive politics among three pivotal groups of unequal size, the paper compares two variants of two-party competition, the objective of a party being the probability of winning (“majority tournament” game) or the expected number of votes (“plurality” game). At a mixedequilibrium, all individuals are, on expectation, treated alike in the plurality game while the tournament game favors individuals in small groups.

Keywords: Social Choice; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy; Gini Index; American Political Science Review (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Party objectives in the "Divide a dollar" electoral competition (2003)
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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_5

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