Party objectives in the "Divide a dollar" electoral competition

Jean-François Laslier

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In the "divide a dollar'' framework of distributive politics among three pivotal groups of unequal size, the paper compares two variants of two-party competition, the objective of a party being the probability of winning (``Majority Tournament'' game) or the expected number of votes ("Plurality'' game). At a mixed equilibrium, all individuals are, on expectation, treated alike in the Plurality Game while the Tournament Game favors individuals in small groups.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Divide a Dollar; Mixed Strategies; Party objective; Compétition électorale; Stratégies mixtes; Blotto; Objectif des partis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242987
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Chapter: Party Objectives in the “Divide a Dollar” Electoral Competition (2005)
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