On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives

Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin () and Fabrice Valognes
Additional contact information
Vincent Merlin: CNRS and University of Caen Basse Normandie, CREM, UMR CNRS 6211

Chapter Chapter 11 in Handbook on Approval Voting, 2010, pp 255-283 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The results presented in this chapter belong to the long tradition of evaluating the voting rules on their propensity to select the Condorcet winner. This tradition dates back to de Borda (1781), who first noticed that just voting for one name and then selecting as a winner the candidate with more votes, could lead to the selection of an option that is beaten by all the other candidates in pairwise comparisons. In order to replace the rule that is now known as the Plurality rule, he suggested a new voting mechanism, which now bares his name, the Borda Count (BC). When m candidates are in competition, Borda suggested that each voter could give m — 1 points to his first choice, m — 2 points to his second choice, and so on down to one point for his next to the last alternative and zero point for the candidate he ranks last. Next, the candidate who receives the highest number of points is declared as the winner.

Keywords: Public Choice; Vote Rule; Preference Type; Condorcet Winner; Approval Vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_11

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642028397

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().