On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
Mostapha Diss,
Vincent Merlin () and
Fabrice Valognes ()
Additional contact information
Fabrice Valognes: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Post-Print from HAL
Keywords: Approval voting; probalities; Condorcet; voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
Published in Laslier Jean-François, Sanver Remzi. Handbook on approval voting, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, pp.255-284, 2010, Studies in choice and welfare
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00533124
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().