On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives

Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin (vincent.merlin@unicaen.fr) and Fabrice Valognes (fabrice.valognes@unicaen.fr)
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Fabrice Valognes: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: Approval voting; probalities; Condorcet; voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Laslier Jean-François, Sanver Remzi. Handbook on approval voting, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, pp.255-284, 2010, Studies in choice and welfare

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00533124

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