Introduction to Part I

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

Chapter Chapter 1 in Strategic Social Choice, 2010, pp 3-6 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we explain why we adopt Gärdenfors’s (1981) model of a constitution rather than Arrow’s model of a (‘well behaved’) social welfare function. We start, in Section 1.2, with the definition of a social welfare function and recall some of the questions that it invoked. Then we proceed to formulate Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in Section 1.3. This theorem has severe implications for Arrow’s notion of a constitution. We quote Arrow’s (1967) account of the dilemma posed by his impossibility theorem.

Keywords: Social Choice; Social Welfare Function; Game Form; Social Choice Function; Impossibility Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_1

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