Strategic Social Choice
Bezalel Peleg and
Hans Peters
in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer, currently edited by Marc Fleurbaey and Maurice Salles
Date: 2010
ISBN: 978-3-642-13875-1
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Chapters in this book:
- Ch Chapter 1 Introduction to Part I
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 10 Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 11 Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 2 Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 3 Nash consistent representations
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 4 Acceptable representations
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 5 Strongly consistent representations
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 6 Nash consistent representation through lottery models
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 7 On the continuity of representations of constitutions
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 8 Introduction to Part II
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
- Ch Chapter 9 Feasible elimination procedures
- Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-642-13875-1
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
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