Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

Chapter Chapter 11 in Strategic Social Choice, 2010, pp 123-145 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we extend the model of Chapters 9 and 10 to a classical voting system with still finitely many alternatives (candidates) but with very many voters. Such a system is representative of political elections on the local or national level. As an, in our view, best approximation we model voters as elements of a non-atomic measure space. In particular, this approach allows us to accommodate the fact that in such voting systems single voters have negligible influence on the final outcome, and to avoid potential combinatorial complexities of a model with a large but finite number of voters.

Keywords: Induction Hypothesis; Vote System; Social Choice Function; Strong Equilibrium; Single Voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Journal Article: Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters (2006)
Journal Article: Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (2006)
Working Paper: Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (2002)
Working Paper: Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_11

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