Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies

Dionysius Glycopantis () and Nicholas C. Yannelis ()
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Dionysius Glycopantis: City University
Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Illinois

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 1-53 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We summarize here basic cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium concepts, in the context of differential information economies with a finite number of agents. These, on the one hand, game theoretic, and, on the other hand, Walrasian equilibrium type concepts are explained, and their relation is pointed out, in the context of specific economies with one or two goods and two or three agents. We analyze the incentive compatibility of several cooperative and noncooperative concepts, and also we discuss briefly the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian equilibria through the construction of relevant game trees. This possibility is related to whether the allocation is incentive compatible. This depends on whether there is free disposal or not.

Keywords: Differential information economy; Walrasian expectations or Radner equilibrium; Rational expectations equilibria; Free disposal; Weak fine core; Private core; Weak fine value; Private value; Coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility; Game trees; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Sequential equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_1

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_1

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