Differential Information Economies

Glycopantis, Dionysius; Yannelis, Nicholas C.

Differential Information Economies

Edited by Dionysius Glycopantis () and Nicholas C. Yannelis ()

in Studies in Economic Theory from Springer, currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis, Timothy J. Kehoe and Bernard Cornet

Date: 2005
ISBN: 978-3-540-26979-3
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Chapters in this book:

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies: Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy: Robert Wilson
Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper: Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicholas C. Yannelis
The core of an economy with differential information: Nicholas C. Yannelis
An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core: Isabelle Lefebvre
On the continuity of expected utility: Erik J. Balder and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core: Frank H. Page
A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw: Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information: Stefan Maus
Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information: Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies: Françoise Forges, Aviad Heifetz and Enrico Minelli
Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core: Stefan Maus
Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information: Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies: Guangsug Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core: Beth Allen
Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm: Tatsuro Ichiishi and Murat Sertel
Optimal multilateral contracts: Stefan Krasa and Anne P. Villamil
Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry: Martin Hellwig
Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans: Jülide Yazar
Incentive compatible contractible information: Philip Bond
Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete: Stefan Krasa and Wayne Shafer
On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms: Gabrielle Demange and Roger Guesnerie
Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection: Douglas Gale
Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core: Konstantinos Serfes
Cooperative games with incomplete information: Roger Myerson
The value allocation of an economy with differential information: Stefan Krasa and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information: Stefan Krasa and Nicholas C. Yannelis
The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information: Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz
Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?: Stefan Krasa1, Akram Temimi and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies: Guangsug Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis
An extensive form interpretation of the private core: Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir and Nicholas C. Yannelis
On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies: Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir and Nicholas C. Yannelis

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DOI: 10.1007/b138401

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