Incentive compatible contractible information

Philip Bond ()
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Philip Bond: Northwestern University

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 377-396 from Springer

Abstract: Summary The paper seeks to characterize what information is always available for contracting, independent of the form of the contract and the probabilities of different states of nature. The paper denotes such information as contractible. It is established that it is possible to speak uniquely of maximal contractible information. Several characterizations are exhibited. In particular, it is shown that if either (a) punishments are bounded everywhere, or (b) deviations from truth-telling are either always or never detected, then maximum contractible information coincides with ∧i ∨j≠i ɛj where ɛj is the information partition of agent j. An argument is given for why (b) may be expected to hold.

Keywords: Contractible information; Incentive compatibility; Information partition; Common knowledge; Cross-reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_20

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_20

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