Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

Stefan Krasa and Wayne Shafer ()
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Wayne Shafer: University of Illinois

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 397-417 from Springer

Abstract: Summary The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents’ net trades are measurable with respect to agents’ private information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations.

Keywords: Differential information; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Journal Article: Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_21

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_21

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