Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information

Stefan Maus ()
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Stefan Maus: University of Maastricht

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 157-171 from Springer

Abstract: Summary A condition is given that is equivalent to balancedness of all NTU-games derived from an exchange economy with asymmetric information when endowments are variable. The condition is applicable to the ex-ante model with expected utilities, but also to the more general model of Arrow-Radner type economies without subjective probabilities. Differences in the interpretation of measurability assumptions between these two models are discussed, and another model with information consistent utility functions is developed in which the result would also hold.

Keywords: Balancedness; Core; Communication system; Exchange economy with asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_9

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_9

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