Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

Guangsug Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis
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Guangsug Hahn: University of Illinois
Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Illinois

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 249-277 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.

Keywords: Private Information; Banach Lattice; Grand Coalition; Incentive Compatibility; Information Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_14

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_14

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