Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

Guangsug Hahn () and Nicholas C. Yannelis ()
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Guangsug Hahn: Korea Economic Research Institute
Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Illinois

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 567-591 from Springer

Abstract: Summary A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.

Keywords: Implementation; Differential information; Cooperative games; Incentive compatibility; Interim private core; Interim private value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_30

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_30

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